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EXCHANGE COMMISSION: MARK CUBAN AND TRADING ON
INSIDE INFORMATION
Steven J. Cleveland
Abstract
By applying the Supreme Court‘s administrative law jurisprudence
to the examination of the validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)—a rule recently
adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission)—
this Article fills a significant gap in the existing literature. To date,
commentators have argued against the rule‘s validity by applying the
Supreme Court‘s securities law jurisprudence without considering the
role of administrative law—despite the Court‘s comments that the
pertinent statute is ambiguous, despite express delegation of rulemaking
authority by Congress to the Commission, and despite developments in
administrative law subsequent to the Court‘s relevant securities law
decisions. By not considering the role of administrative law,
commentators have approached the rule with undue skepticism.
Administrative law principles dictate judicial deference to the
Commission‘s rule. The Commission once commanded deference from
courts. The time has come to resurrect that deference.
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INTRODUCTION
Mark Cuban earned billions during the Internet boom of the late
1990s; in the year 2000, he used some of those earnings to purchase a
majority interest in the Dallas Mavericks, a member of the National
Basketball Association (NBA).1 Not content to watch his team from a
luxury box high above the court, Cuban regularly sits courtside and, like
other fans, enthusiastically comments on the action. Perhaps his
enthusiasm has gotten the better of him; he has repeatedly and publicly
criticized NBA referees and league officials. Perhaps not surprisingly,
the NBA has fined Cuban multiple times for flouting its authority.2
Cuban‘s run-ins with authority, however, have not been limited to the
sporting realm.
In 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission)
accused Cuban of violating federal securities laws. According to the
allegations of the Commission, the Chief Executive Officer of
Mamma.com Inc. (MCI) contacted Cuban—who owned approximately
6% of the outstanding shares of MCI—and offered to share material,
nonpublic information if Cuban agreed to maintain its confidentiality.3
Cuban allegedly accepted those terms; after learning the information,
however, he promptly sold his entire stake in the company.4 Cuban sold
his stock for approximately $13.30 per share on June 28 and 29, 2004—
before the information became known publicly.5 After the markets
closed on June 29, 2004, MCI publicly disclosed the information;
trading in the company‘s stock opened the following day at $11.89 per
share, and ultimately closed that day at $11.99 per share.6 By trading in
advance of the disclosure of that material, nonpublic information,
Cuban avoided the loss of more than $750,000.7 The Commission

1. See Mike Wise, Despite Expectation, Magic Is Doing Well, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2000,
at 85.
2. See Timeline of Mark Cuban Fines, ESPN (June 20, 2006), http://sports.espn.go.com/
espn/wire?section=nba&id=2492950.
3. See Complaint at 3–5, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 08
Civ. 2050-D); id. at 5–6 (discussing the share price and amount of loss avoided). The
information concerned a private investment in public equity (PIPE) offering. See id. at 3.
Because a company is more likely to issue stock when its shares are overvalued, the market may
respond negatively to news of an upcoming issuance. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm‘n, SEC Charges Hedge Fund Manager Hilary Shane with Insider Trading (May 18,
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-76.htm (alleging insider trading when
insider shorted stock prior to public disclosure of PIPE offering); see, e.g., JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 136 (6th ed. 2009) (noting the experience of
Boston Chicken, Inc.).
4. Complaint, supra note 3, at 5.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 5–6.
7. Id. at 6.
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accused Cuban of committing securities fraud by engaging in illegal
insider trading.8
The district court dismissed the Commission‘s complaint, reasoning
that even if Cuban agreed to maintain the company‘s confidences, he
did not agree to forgo any securities trade based on the confidential
information.9 Trading, however, discloses information, even if it does so
indirectly and imprecisely.10 The Fifth Circuit determined that the
allegations provided a plausible basis to conclude that Cuban
understood that he was not to trade and that his agreement with the
company was more than a simple confidentiality agreement.11
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary to identify the
contours of a relationship of ―trust and confidence,‖ or to speak to the
validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), promulgated under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).12
Some of the leading business law scholars (BLS)—Professors
Stephen Bainbridge, Alan Bromberg, Allen Ferrell, M. Todd
Henderson, and Jonathan R. Macey—believe that, based upon Supreme
Court precedent, illegal insider trading requires the breach of a fiduciary
duty (or a similar duty of trust and confidence) when silence serves as
the basis for the fraud.13 Applying this rationale to the Cuban case, they
conclude that Cuban could not have engaged in illegal insider trading,
because a confidentiality agreement alone does not suffice to establish a
fiduciary (or similar) relationship.14 From their perspective, the
Commission exceeded its authority by promulgating a rule imposing

8. Id. at 6–8.
9. See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725–26, 731 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
10. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and
the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 336; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 631 (1984) (noting that
an insider‘s trade has communicative value, but is not an efficient means of communication);
Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider
Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 56–57 (1984) (―[A duty may be] breached as much by
wrongful disclosure as by wrongful trading.‖). In Cuban, the district court apparently failed to
appreciate the communicative value of the defendant‘s trades. See 634 F. Supp. 2d at 725–26.
Within a thirty-six-hour period, Cuban went from being the company‘s largest shareholder (with
6% of its shares) to owning zero shares of the company. Id. at 718. But cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(2006) (requiring disclosure of trades by 10% owners of specified issuers‘ equity securities).
11. See SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 557–58 (5th Cir. 2010).
12. Id. at 558 & n.40.
13. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellee at 10–16,
SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-10996) [hereinafter BLS‘ Appellate Brief];
Amended Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss at 2–3, SEC v.
Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 08 Civ. 2050-D) [hereinafter BLS‘ Trial
Brief].
14. See BLS‘ Appellate Brief, supra note 13, at 21–22; BLS‘ Trial Brief, supra note 13, at
2–3.
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insider-trading liability based upon the breach of a confidentiality
agreement.15
This Article argues that the Commission did not exceed its
authority.16 Part I introduces background on the Commission‘s
regulation of insider trading. Part II then challenges the underlying
premise of the BLS that silence cannot be deceptive absent the breach
of a fiduciary (or similar) duty. The BLS premise their argument on
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the statute in cases involving
insider trading, but they ignore the Court‘s precedent concerning
administrative law. This Article fills a gap in the literature by
considering the role of administrative law when addressing the validity
of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1).
Contrary to the BLS‘ premise, the Supreme Court defines the scope
of insider-trading liability only until the Commission offers an
alternative, reasonable interpretation of statutory ambiguity.17 In
15. See BLS‘ Appellate Brief, supra note 13, at 21–27; BLS‘ Trial Brief, supra note 13, at
2–3. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A
Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 95 (1998) (―There is little justification for
making the breach of an agency or fiduciary duty to an employer, client, or similar beneficiary a
federal, rather than a state law, claim unless a national economic interest is implicated.‖).
16. To be clear, this Article addresses whether the Commission possesses the power to
promulgate Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), not whether the Commission should have promulgated the rule.
Others have addressed whether the Commission should regulate insider trading. See HENRY G.
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 163–67 (1966) (opposing federal
regulation); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 282–89 (1982)
(favoring federal regulation); Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider
Trading on Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881 (2010) (favoring federal
regulation of outsider trading).
17. See infra Subsection II.B.1. This Article focuses on civil enforcement actions by the
Commission, not private causes of actions implied by the courts. Private causes of action may
subject defendants to abuse, see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), and may be subject to limitations inapplicable to civil
enforcement actions by the Commission. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774 n.6
(1979) (distinguishing between governmental enforcement actions and potentially frivolous
private litigation). Greater specificity might be required for purposes of criminal enforcement.
See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (―[I]t is appropriate to apply the rule of
lenity in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute‘s coverage.‖); United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (―Useful as such an elastic and expedient
definition of confidential relations, i.e., relations of trust and confidence, may be in the civil
context, it has no place in the criminal law.‖); United States v. Cassese, 273 F. Supp. 2d 481,
486 n.1, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting defendant‘s motion to dismiss criminal charges, noting
that the Commission refused to bring civil enforcement action); Stephen Joyce, Lawyers Say
High Court Honest Services Case Will Hamper Prosecution of Corporate Fraud, 42 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1824 (Sept. 27, 2010) (criticizing ―controversial prosecutions in which the
line between civil and criminal conduct was blurred‖ and in which ―wrongdoing by
breaching . . . fiduciary duties . . . might [be] . . . transformed into federal criminal fraud
cases‖); Yin Wilczek, Judge, Attorneys Debate Vagueness of Standard for Securities Fraud
Liability, 42 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1541 (Aug 16, 2010) (discussing dismissal with
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National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Services, the Supreme Court held that a court‘s interpretation of an
ambiguous statute does not prevent an administering agency from
interpreting the statute differently, and the agency‘s interpretation, so
long as it is reasonable, displaces that of the court.18 So while the BLS
may be correct that, when interpreting a statutory ambiguity, the
Supreme Court has emphasized the violation of a fiduciary (or similar)
duty before silence could constitute deception under § 10(b),19 the
Supreme Court‘s emphasis does not prohibit the Commission from
interpreting that ambiguity differently. Moreover, in § 10(b), Congress
expressly delegated rulemaking authority to the Commission.
Consequently, courts should defer to the agency‘s reasonable
interpretation regarding the party deceived, which interpretation the
Commission forged in Rule 10b5-2(b)(1). In light of the text of § 10(b),
its ambiguity regarding deception, and the Supreme Court‘s
administrative law jurisprudence, courts should defer to the reasonable
policy interpretations made by the Commission that result from noticeand-comment rulemaking. The Commission once commanded
deference from the Court.20 The time has come for resurrecting that
deference.
prejudice of criminal charges, but dismissal without prejudice of Commission‘s civil
enforcement action).
18. See Nat‘l Cable & Telecomm. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983–84
(2005) (―Since Chevron teaches that a court‘s opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous
statute an agency is charged with administering is not authoritative, the agency‘s decision to
construe that statute differently from a court does not say that the court‘s holding was legally
wrong. Instead, the agency may, consistent with the court‘s holding, choose a different
construction, since the agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within the limits of reason)
of such statutes.‖).
19. See infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
20. Compare Int‘l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) (―It is a
commonplace in our jurisprudence that an administrative agency‘s consistent, longstanding
interpretation of the statute under which it operates is entitled to considerable weight.‖), United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 n.25 (1975) (―Traditionally the views of an
agency charged with administering the governing statute would be entitled to considerable
weight.‖), and SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1946) (―The Commission has
followed the same definition in its own administrative proceedings.‖), with Lampf v. Gilbertson,
501 U.S. 350, 354–55 (1991) (rejecting, without any reference to Chevron, the Commission‘s
proposed limitations period for a private action under § 10(b)), Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 197–99 (1976) (rejecting, without any reference to Skidmore, the Commission‘s
interpretation regarding the defendant‘s mental state), and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738–39, 746 n.10 (1975) (rejecting, without any reference to Skidmore,
the Commission‘s interpretation regarding the plaintiff‘s standing). Though the Court largely
accepted the Solicitor General‘s position in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008), the Commission articulated a contrary position in the lower
courts; the Solicitor General prohibited the Commission from presenting that contrary position
to the Court. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Limits Lawsuits by Shareholders, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at C1 (―The Securities and Exchange Commission supported the
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I. THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING GENERALLY
In 1934, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act, which
created the Commission to administer the federal securities laws and
included § 10(b).21 Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . . [t]o use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.22
Though it prohibited deceptive devices and contrivances,23 Congress did
not define any of those terms and it provided no specificity regarding
the identification of the deceived party. By prohibiting deception ―in
connection with‖ the purchase or sale of a security, Congress intended
to prohibit deception beyond that which occurs ―in‖ or ―during‖ a
purchase or sale of securities.24 That is, the statute prohibits more than a
purchaser‘s deception of a seller and a seller‘s deception of a
purchaser.25 Consequently, the ―in connection with‖ language certainly
broadens the pool of persons who may have been deceived contrary to
the statute, but Congress left ambiguous whose deception can constitute
a violation.
In § 10(b), Congress prohibited nothing except that which
contravenes rules that the Commission may promulgate. Thereby,
Congress expressly delegated rulemaking authority to the Commission.
Congress intentionally left a gap for the agency to fill.26 Moreover, the
plaintiffs . . . . [T]he S.E.C. was denied authority to file a brief. Justice Kennedy‘s opinion on
Tuesday closely tracked the brief that Solicitor General Paul D. Clement eventually filed.‖).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006).
22. Id. § 78j(b).
23. ―Manipulative‖ is a term of art that has been defined narrowly. See Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
24. See United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
25. See id. at 658 (―The misappropriation theory comports with § 10(b)‘s language, which
requires deception ‗in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,‘ not deception of an
identifiable purchaser or seller.‖); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981)
(―[T]he language of Rule 10b-5 . . . contains no specific requirement that fraud be perpetrated
upon the seller or buyer of securities.‖).
26. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007).
[T]he ultimate question is whether Congress would have intended, and
expected, courts to treat an agency‘s rule, regulation, application of a statute, or
other agency action as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency of ‗gapfilling‘ authority. Where an agency rule sets forth important . . . duties, where
the agency focuses fully and directly upon the issue, where the agency uses full
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congressional language—―as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors‖—makes plain the general
policy making authority that Congress delegated to the Commission.
An episode of insider trading reportedly prompted the Commission
to exercise the authority granted by Congress under § 10(b) and to
promulgate Rule 10b-5, which generally prohibits securities fraud.
During the 1940s, a business executive falsely presented to his investors
a bleak future for the company.27 The false news prompted investors to
sell their shares in the company, and the price of the company‘s
securities consequently fell. Knowing that the company actually had a
rosy future, the business executive then purchased shares of the
company at a depressed price, which rebounded when the true state of
affairs came to light. Because neither the federal statutes nor existing
Commission rules clearly prohibited fraud in the purchase of shares (as
opposed to fraud in the sale of shares), and because such behavior may
be ―contrary to the public interest‖ and may evidence a need for
investor protection, the Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5.28
notice-and-comment procedures to promulgate a rule, where the resulting rule
falls within the statutory grant of authority, and where the rule itself is
reasonable, then a court ordinarily assumes that Congress intended it to defer to
the agency‘s determination.
Id. at 173–174.
27. For the factual background of this episode, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 212 n.32 (1976).
28. As of this writing, Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). Though § 10(b) as originally enacted may not have been intended
to prohibit insider trading generally, see Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 429–30 (1990), subsequent congressional
enactments support a view of § 10(b) that encompasses a prohibition of insider trading. See
generally Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
§ 2, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, §§ 1–2,
98 Stat. 1264 (1984).
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Although each references ―any person,‖ neither § 10(b) nor Rule
10b-5 specifically references insiders or insider trading.29 Section 10(b)
speaks of ―deceptive devices and contrivances.‖ Rule 10b-5 speaks of
―fraud, deceit, and materially misleading misstatements or omissions.‖
Since enacting § 10(b), Congress has spoken of the evils of insider
trading, but it has consciously avoided attempts to define insider
trading.30 Similarly, the Commission generally has eschewed defining
insider trading for fear of providing a blueprint for mischief. 31 The
Commission generally has utilized enforcement actions to establish the
parameters of prohibited conduct on a case-by-case basis.32
Consequently, the Commission, the courts, and the parties struggle to
identify the parameters of legal conduct.33
Affirmative misrepresentations yield relatively straightforward
analysis.34 Misleading omissions that give rise to liability, however,
have proved perplexing. If an outsider of the company works diligently
29. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006) (requiring disgorgement of short-swing trading profits
by certain directors, officers, and large shareholders).
30. See H.R. REP. No. 100-910 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6048
(―While cognizant of the importance of providing clear guidelines for behavior [involving
insider trading] which may be subject to stiff criminal and civil penalties, the Committee
nevertheless declined to include a statutory definition in this bill . . . .‖); H.R. REP. NO. 98-355
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2287 (―[E]vidence seems to show that any effort
to define insider trading would result in, at best, a slightly less generalized rule than 10b-5 and,
at worst, a rule that leaves gaping holes . . . .‖).
31. See Karmel, supra note 15, at 127 (―[T]he SEC is a prosecutorial agency that has long
articulated the view that detailed regulations will be a blueprint for fraud and therefore it is
better to rely upon general antifraud concepts to police the securities markets.‖).
32. See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA 106 (1982) (suggesting that the SEC
looks and thinks like a legal adversary of the securities industry); Karmel, supra note 15, at 126
(―[T]he SEC has developed its insider trading policies through ad hoc enforcement cases . . . .‖).
33. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices about Investor
Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1622 (2006) (―While its
motivations connect closely to historic values, insider trading doctrine itself is messy,
incoherent, and result-oriented . . . .‖). As is the case with other complicated areas of law, the
analytical approach applicable to one area of regulated conduct may not apply with full force to
a different area of that regulated conduct. See generally United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct.
1577, 1580 (2010) (rejecting the argument that courts should employ a balancing test to
determine the applicability of First Amendment protection to animal cruelty videos, despite
precedent calling for a balancing test to determine the applicability of First Amendment
protection to other categories of speech).
34. For example, if Cuban intended to trade on the information at the time that he entered
into the confidentiality agreement, then he would have affirmatively misrepresented his intent to
maintain the information‘s confidentiality. Cf. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49–50 (2d Cir.
2009) (distinguishing between silence and affirmative misrepresentation to gain access to
information); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 406 (7th Cir. 1991) (describing a former employee
who, despite his termination, misrepresented his ongoing employment with the source to
continue access to material, nonpublic information).
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and (legally) unearths information that enables her to trade profitably in
the company‘s securities, then she should retain the profits from the
trade as the fruits of her labor. Requiring her to disclose the information
to others before allowing her to trade would decrease or eliminate her
profit and discourage her diligent quest for valuable information. Such
diligence, however, should be encouraged, not discouraged.35 Though it
may have been advocated in individual cases, neither the Commission
nor the Supreme Court has supported the parity of information rationale,
which would require one who discovers information either to abstain
from trading or disclose the information to others before trading.36
Rejecting the parity of information rationale, however, does nothing
to provide a coherent rationale for imposing liability stemming from
one‘s silence. Typically, silence is not troubling in a transaction. Caveat
emptor frequently provides the rule of thumb. Caveat emptor applies
more easily when tangible property, as opposed to stock, changes hands.
Further complicating the analysis, stock is routinely traded
impersonally. Without personal interaction, silence is what one expects
to hear from the counterparty, so silence generally does not mislead.
Given Congress‘s and the Commission‘s prior unwillingness to
provide the requisite guidance, courts have filled the void. As to
whether silence may constitute the deception required by § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the judiciary has premised insider-trading liability on a
breach of fiduciary duty.37 The Supreme Court described the principal
theories of liability for such insider trading to include the following: (1)
when an insider breaches a fiduciary duty by trading on the basis of
material, nonpublic information;38 (2) when an insider, in breach of a
fiduciary duty, tips a third party who knows or should know of the
breach and who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information;39
35. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 131–45 (1966)
(discussing the entrepreneur‘s compensation).
36. See Karmel, supra note 15, at 89 (―[T]he parity of information theory has not been
accepted by the Supreme Court or the SEC itself.‖).
37. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice
Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1590 (1999). Aside from
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the federal government otherwise relegates insider trading. See,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006) (requiring disgorgement of short-swing profits obtained by
certain directors and officers).
38. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–29 (1980); id. at 230 (―Application
of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation
to place the shareholder‘s welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through
fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information.‖). The prohibition extends to temporary
insiders. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983) (―Under certain circumstances, such
as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or
consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders.‖).
39. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (―[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders
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and (3) when an outsider trades on the basis of material, nonpublic
information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source
of that information.40
Long advocated by the Commission, the third theory—the
misappropriation theory—was most recently accepted by the Supreme
Court, and it is the misappropriation theory that gave rise to Rule 10b52(b)(1), the rule at issue in the case against Mark Cuban. But first, a few
words on the Supreme Court‘s decision to embrace the misappropriation
theory, according to which the deceived party is not the counterparty to
the trade.
In United States v. O’Hagan, Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met)
formed a secret plan to acquire the Pillsbury Company.41 Such an
acquisition, on a per-share basis, would not occur at the price listed on a
stock exchange. An exchange lists the price for one share, a relatively
inconsequential amount. Grant Met did not want to purchase a relatively
inconsequential amount; it wanted to buy control of Pillsbury. To
acquire control, one must pay a premium above the price listed on an
exchange.42 Grand Met maintained the secrecy of its plan, because if
news of its plan leaked to the public, then the price for Pillsbury would
have risen and jeopardized the success of the planned acquisition.43
To facilitate its plan, Grand Met retained counsel in Minnesota,
where Pillsbury was headquartered.44 James Herman O‘Hagan—who
was an attorney at the Minnesota law firm, but was not personally
representing Grand Met—learned of the planned acquisition from an
attorney at his law firm who was representing Grand Met.45 O‘Hagan
then acquired securities issued by Pillsbury, knowing that their value
would increase when Grand Met eventually announced its plan to the

of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.‖).
40. United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (―Is a person who trades in
securities for personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a
fiduciary duty to the source of the information, guilty of violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5? . . .
[Y]es . . . .‖).
41. For the factual background of the case, see O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48.
42. See Paramount Commc‘ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994)
(―The acquisition of majority status and the consequent privilege of exerting the powers of
majority ownership come at a price. That price is usually a control premium which recognizes
not only the value of a control block of shares, but also compensates the minority stockholders
for their resulting loss of voting power.‖); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 1137 (6th ed. 2004) (―Of course, stock market value represented the value of
minority shares because controlling shares do not trade.‖).
43. See Macey, supra note 10, at 25.
44. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647.
45. Id. at 647, 649 n.1.
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public.46 Following Grand Met‘s public announcement, O‘Hagan
profited on the sales of his Pillsbury securities.47 O‘Hagan appealed
criminal convictions on numerous counts of violating, among other
federal securities laws and regulations, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.48
Then-existing Supreme Court precedent interpreting § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 may not have sufficed to discipline O‘Hagan.49 O‘Hagan
was not a fiduciary or insider of Pillsbury, in whose securities he
traded.50 Shareholders of Pillsbury had not placed their trust in him. No
one at Pillsbury, in whose securities O‘Hagan traded, had tipped him
about the acquisition. Pillsbury—like the market at large—was ignorant
of Grand Met‘s secret plan at the time of O‘Hagan‘s trades.
The Commission had long pursued defendants under a theory of
misappropriation, which had divided the circuit courts of appeals.51
Twice before, the Supreme Court had been presented with the question
whether liability under § 10(b) could be based upon the
misappropriation theory, but in one case, the theory had not been
presented to the jury, and in the other case, the Court divided evenly on
the issue.52 Given a third opportunity, the Court upheld the validity of
the misappropriation theory. ―[T]he misappropriation theory outlaws
trading on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate ‗outsider‘
in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the
information.‖53 The statutorily required deception is perpetrated on the
source of the confidential information to whom the fiduciary ―feign[ed]
fidelity.‖54
―Although the Court . . . approved the misappropriation theory
in . . . O’Hagan, it did not develop a broad doctrine or policy rationale
[to] . . . assist the lower courts in distinguishing between lawful and
unlawful outsider trading.‖55 Though it may be advisable for the Court
46. Id. at 647.
47. Id. at 648.
48. Id. at 648–49.
49. See id. at 653 n.5.
50. Id.
51. Compare United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(upholding the validity of the misappropriation theory), SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th
Cir. 1991) (same), and SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), with United
States v. O‘Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 613–14 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the validity of the
misappropriation theory), and United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943-59 (4th Cir. 1995)
(same).
52. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235–36 (1980); Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987); see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983) (noting that the
defendant did not misappropriate the information used by others to trade profitably).
53. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53.
54. Id. at 655; see id. at 652 (―[A] fiduciary‘s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal‘s
information . . . defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information.‖).
55. Karmel, supra note 15, at 84.
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to issue narrow rulings,56 the Commission has been criticized for
regulating on a case-by-case basis, instead of promulgating broad rules
that facilitate transaction planning and dispute resolution. Following the
Court‘s decision in United States v. O’Hagan, the Commission
promulgated a new rule.57 Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) provides a nonexclusive
basis for liability under the misappropriation theory; the requisite duty
exists ―[w]henever a person agrees to maintain information in
confidence.‖58
II. THE COMMISSION‘S REGULATION OF SILENCE AS DECEPTION
According to the BLS, Supreme Court precedent requires the breach
of a fiduciary (or similar) duty before silence can be deceptive in a
securities trade. And, the argument continues, because a simple
confidentiality agreement alone does not give rise to a fiduciary (or
similar) relationship, the Commission exceeded its authority in
56. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1996).
57. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51734 (Aug. 24,
2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2012)) (―[T]he rule will provide greater clarity and
certainty to the law . . . .‖).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2012). Rule 10b5-2(a) provides that ―[t]his section
shall apply to any violation of Section 10(b) of the Act . . . and [Rule 10b-5] thereunder that is
based on the purchase or sale of securities on the basis of, or the communication of, material
nonpublic information misappropriated in breach of a duty of trust or confidence.‖ Id.
§ 240.10b5-2(a).
Some scholars note the distinction between the Supreme Court‘s language (duty of trust
and confidence) and the language of the Commission‘s rule (duty of trust or confidence). See
Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 1315, 1360 (2009). In this instance, emphasis on the and/or distinction may be misplaced.
First, Congress, not the Supreme Court, delineates the reach of § 10(b), see U.S. CONST. art. I,
§§ 7, 8, and the statute speaks of deception. The Supreme Court‘s ―and‖ (rather than the
Commission‘s ―or‖) is not critical to deception. See W. Page Keeton, Fraud—Concealment and
Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12 (1936) (noting that silence can be deceptive where
―one . . . of the parties expressly reposes a trust or confidence in the other‖) (emphasis added).
Second, ―confidence‖ and ―trust‖ overlap. Webster‘s Dictionary defines ―confidence‖ as ―a
relation of trust.‖ WEBSTER‘S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 275 (1983) (definition 3a).
―Trust‖ is defined as ―one in which confidence is placed.‖ Id. at 1268 (definition 1b). Despite
the overlap of their meaning, one might be inclined to interpret the words ―trust‖ and
―confidence‖ to mean different things; otherwise, there is no reason to use two words when one
would do. The Supreme Court, however, used the singular—duty of trust and confidence—as
opposed to the plural—duties of trust and confidence, suggesting that the Court employed
overlapping rhetoric, never intending emphasis on any possible distinction between ―trust‖ and
―confidence.‖ But see Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (referencing the ―duties of
care and loyalty‖ to indicate separate and distinct concepts). Finally, the Supreme Court has
criticized hypertechnical interpretations of the Exchange Act, see SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S.
813, 819 (2002) (―construed, not technically and restrictively, but flexibly . . . .‖) (internal
quotation marks omitted), so one need not hypertechnically construe rhetorical dicta included in
its opinions interpreting the Exchange Act.
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promulgating Rule 10b5-2(b)(1). The BLS, however, misperceive
congressional allocation of interpretive authority between the courts and
the Commission. Contrary to the position espoused in the writings of
the BLS, the Commission, in promulgating Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), acted
consistent with § 10(b) and with the Supreme Court‘s administrative
law and securities law precedent.
Congress unquestionably wields the power to legislate,59 but it
inevitably enacts ambiguous statutes.60 Consequently, the resolution of
statutory ambiguity is a pervasive problem. In the absence of
congressional clarification, who should resolve the ambiguity—a court,
or the agency charged by Congress to administer the ambiguous statute?
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,61
the Supreme Court formalized its practice of according weight to the
position articulated by an administering agency: If Congress did not
squarely address the issue and if the administering agency‘s
interpretation of the statutory ambiguity is reasonable, then a court
should defer to the agency‘s interpretation, even if the court might have
interpreted the ambiguity differently.62
Consequently, analysis under Chevron generally involves a two-step
inquiry. Step One involves the determination of whether the statute is
ambiguous. Step Two involves the determination of whether the
agency‘s interpretation is reasonable. Because the Court has not always
applied Chevron analysis, despite its apparent applicability, some
conclude that the Court undertakes a preliminary determination before
applying Chevron‘s two steps, with the preliminary determination
termed ―Step Zero.‖63 So, for example, some matters might be deemed
too significant for Congress to have delegated their resolution to an
agency, such as the regulation of physician-assisted suicide.64 Congress,
59. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 8.
60. See generally Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (interpreting the
phrase ―carries a firearm‖); id. at 144 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (―And in the television series
‗M*A*S*H,‘ Hawkeye Pierce (played by Alan Alda) presciently proclaims: ‗I will not carry a
gun. . . . I‘ll carry your books, I‘ll carry a torch, I‘ll carry a tune, I‘ll carry on, carry over, carry
forward, Cary Grant, cash and carry, carry me back to Old Virginia, I‘ll even hari-kari if you
show me how, but I will not carry a gun!‘‖) (citation omitted).
61. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
62. See id. at 842–44; Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 (2010)
(―[The Court must] accept . . . those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the
principles of construction courts normally employ.‖) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
63. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873
(2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006) (discussing
considerations that might arise prior to Chevron Step One). Congress, however, delegated to the
Commission rulemaking authority in § 10(b), empowering the Commission to identify those
deceptive practices that will be prohibited.
64. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267–68 (2006) (―The importance of the issue
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however, delegated significant authority to the Commission, including
interpretative authority regarding § 10(b).
A. Congressional Delegation to the Commission
A statutory ambiguity leaves room for an agency to fill the gap, but
Congress must have charged the agency with administering the
ambiguous statute.65 Congress created the Commission to administer the
Exchange Act.66 Congress granted the Commission rulemaking
authority generally and, in particular, with respect to § 10(b).67
Congress empowered the Commission to investigate statutory and rules
violations.68 Congress empowered the Commission to conduct
administrative cease-and-desist proceedings for present, past, or future
statutory and rules violations,69 as well as general administrative
proceedings.70 In addition to administrative proceedings, the
Commission may pursue injunctions, fines, and penalties in federal
court.71 In light of these far-ranging delegated powers, and in particular

of physician-assisted suicide, which has been the subject of an earnest and profound debate
across the country, makes the oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more suspect.‖)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, 531
U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (―Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide
elephants in mouseholes.‖); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160
(2000) (―[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of
such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.‖).
65. Compare SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (―[The SEC‘s] interpretation
of the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the context of formal adjudication, is entitled to deference if
it is reasonable, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30, and n. 12 (2001).‖),
with Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152–53 (2008)
(refusing to defer to the Commission‘s position presented in a private cause of action where the
Commission was not administering the statute).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006); Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511
U.S. 164, 173 (1994) (―[Congress] envisioned that the SEC would enforce the statutory
prohibition [of Section 10(b)] through administrative and injunctive actions.‖).
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (―It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.‖); id. § 78w(a)(1) (―The Commission . . . shall . . . have power to make
such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of
this chapter for which [it is] responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in [it] by
this chapter . . . .‖).
68. See id. §§ 78u(a), (c).
69. See id. § 78u-3.
70. See id. §§ 78o(c)(4), 78u-2; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010) (expanding coverage to all
persons, not just those associated with registered entities).
71. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78u-1, 78aa (2006).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss1/2

14

Cleveland: Resurrecting Deference to the Securities and Exchange Commission:

2013]

RESURRECTING DEFERENCE TO THE SECURITES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

87

the rulemaking authority granted under § 10(b), Congress intended the
Commission to fill statutory gaps and, in particular, gaps in § 10(b).72
Concluding that the Commission has the authority to fill a statutory
gap does not end the inquiry. Deference follows agency positions that
have the force of law. A position has the force of law if it results from
formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.73 The Court
previously has deferred to the Commission‘s interpretation of an
ambiguity of § 10(b) in the context of a formal adjudication.74 Rule
72. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202–03 (1975) (stating that § 10(b)
was intended as a ―catch-all‖ and that the ―Commission should have the authority to deal with
new manipulative devices‖) (quoting Thomas G. Corcoran, who is credited as a coauthor of
federal securities regulation of the 1930s, see ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON
JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 322, 326 (1982)); see also COX, supra note 3 (―[T]he Exchange
Act is in large part a laundry list of problems for which Congress articulated neither the means
nor the end objective. Instead, Congress . . . created the Securities and Exchange Commission
and delegated to it the task of grappling with the problem areas.‖); cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546
U.S. 243, 259–60 (2006) (according less deference to an agency position when Congress
delegated only limited powers to be exercised in limited ways). The statutory ambiguities that
gave rise to Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) fall within the Commission‘s domain, but there may be certain
ambiguities regarding § 10(b) that Congress intended the courts—not the Commission—to
resolve. For example, Congress may have intended the courts—not the Commission—to
determine the scope of private causes of action. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152–53 (2008); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 746 n.10 (1975); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 579 (2009)
(―Congress likely intended courts to interpret the PSLRA or at least knew that they would. The
explanation is straightforward: courts have been the primary interpreters of securities law in the
context of private class actions.‖). When private parties litigate, the Commission may play a
diminished role. Given the potential abuse posed by private plaintiffs, the scope of private
causes of action might be a matter deemed too significant for Congress to have delegated its
resolution to an agency, such that Chevron deference may not be appropriate. See Gonzales, 546
U.S. at 267 (―The importance of the issue . . . , which has been the subject of an earnest and
profound debate across the country, makes the oblique form of the claimed delegation all the
more suspect.‖) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) (―[W]e are confident that Congress could
not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an
agency in so cryptic a fashion.‖). However, misappropriation principally arises in public
enforcement actions, rather than private lawsuits, see Matthew A. Aufman, Note, Civil Liability
under Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 for Misappropriators of Nonpublic Information: An Argument
for Consistency, 40 B.C. L. REV. 829, 849 (1999) (―Few lawsuits have been brought to date
under the misappropriation theory of Rule 10b-5 . . . .‖), because the deceived source may have
neither purchased nor sold securities, see Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 738–39, and because of
the difficulty faced by third-party traders in establishing causation and reliance. See Stoneridge,
552 U.S. at 152–53.
73. Compare United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)
(―[Congressionally] delegated authority . . . carrying the force of law . . . may be shown . . . by
an agency‘s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking . . . .‖), with
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (―Interpretations such as those
in . . . policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the
force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.‖).
74. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (―[The SEC‘s] interpretation of
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10b5-2(b)(1) resulted from formal notice-and-comment rulemaking,75
and should command judicial deference so long as the statute is
ambiguous and the Commission‘s rule reasonably resolves the
ambiguity.
B. Statutory Ambiguity
A court owes no deference to an administrative agency regarding an
issue on which the statute is unambiguous.76 The Exchange Act,
however, is ambiguous regarding the points for which the Commission
promulgated Rule 10b5-2(b)(1). In § 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
Congress prohibited deception in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security. Congress provided no guidance regarding what parties
might be deceived.77 Moreover, Congress did not prohibit deception
―in‖ or ―during‖ the purchase or sale of a security; it prohibited
deception ―in connection with‖ the purchase or sale of a security. The
language ―in connection with‖ makes it plain that Congress intended to
protect parties beyond a deceived seller or a deceived purchaser.
Congress, however, gave no additional guidance. Consequently, the
Commission could promulgate a rule regarding the deception of a
source of confidential nonpublic information.78
To the extent that one finds legislative history persuasive,79
Congress has contemplated imposing liability under the securities laws
for misappropriating information in violation of contractual

the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the context of formal adjudication, is entitled to deference if it
is reasonable, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30, and n. 12 (2001).‖).
75. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51738 (Aug. 24,
2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2012)) (adopting, among other rules, Rule 10b5-2),
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72590, 72610 (Dec. 28, 1999) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposing, among other rules, Rule 10b5-2). See generally
Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439, 456 (2010)
(―[D]ecisions . . . [should] . . . be made publicly and explicitly through rule-making. Simply
placing the fiduciary label on the securities industry and leaving the rest to ad hoc decisions will
produce a platform that is neither stable nor functional.‖).
76. See Nat‘l Cable & Telecomm. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83
(2005) (―Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the
agency‘s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a
conflicting agency construction.‖).
77. See United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 660 (1997) (noting that the statute does
not refer to ―identifiable purchasers or sellers of securities‖).
78. See generally In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 915 (1961) (―The absence of
a remedy by the private litigant because of lack of privity does not absolve an insider from
responsibility for fraudulent conduct.‖); Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High about Rule
10b-5: Chiarella’s History, Central Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 881 n.89 (1995)
(implying that the misappropriation theory is not precluded by the text of the statute).
79. But see FCC v. NextWave Personal Commc‘ns, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 305 (2003)
(criticizing the use of ―ever-available snippets of legislative history‖).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss1/2

16

Cleveland: Resurrecting Deference to the Securities and Exchange Commission:

2013]

RESURRECTING DEFERENCE TO THE SECURITES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

89

obligations.80 Reportedly, Congress never acted on such proposals—not
because the bills would have imposed liability based on a breach of
contract, but because of disagreement regarding the imposition of
liability based on mere possession of inside information coincident to
the troubling trade, as opposed to actual use of inside information in
effecting a trade.81 Though the evidence does not incontrovertibly
establish that Congress actually approves of a contractually imposed
duty underlying a violation of § 10(b),82 the evidence hardly suggests
that Congress precluded the Commission from promulgating such a
rule.
Confronted with a statute that prohibited deception but did not state
whether silence could be deceptive,83 the Court reasonably determined
that silence could not be deceptive absent a duty to disclose.84 The BLS
conclude that the Court‘s interpretation eliminates any statutory
ambiguity and precludes any interpretive role for the Commission.85
The Commission, however, acted within its rights in promulgating Rule
10b5-2(b)(1); the BLS ignore the Court‘s administrative law precedent,
and interpret the Court‘s securities law precedent too narrowly.
1. Consideration of the Court‘s Administrative Law Precedent
The BLS entitled the third section of their amicus brief filed with
the Fifth Circuit as ―The SEC‘s justification for expanding liability
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cannot overturn Supreme Court
precedent.‖86 The premise that an agency overturns a court‘s decision is
faulty, as the Court noted in Brand X:
The dissent [argues] that allowing an agency to override
what a court believes to be the best interpretation of a
statute makes ―judicial decisions subject to reversal by
executive officers.‖ It does not. Since Chevron teaches that
80. See S. 1380, 100th Cong. §2 (1987) (―[I]nformation shall have been used or obtained
wrongfully only if . . . by . . . misappropriation or a breach of any fiduciary, contractual,
employment, personal, or other relationship of trust and confidence.‖) (emphasis added).
81. See Karmel, supra note 15, at 100. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2012).
82. For example, subsequent legislation carries more weight than does subsequent
legislative history. Compare Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1969)
(―Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in
statutory construction.‖), with Consumer Prod. Safety Comm‘n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 118 n.13 (1980) (―A mere statement in a conference report of such legislation as to what
the Committee believes an earlier statute meant is obviously less weighty.‖).
83. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (―[Section] 10(b) does not
state whether silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive device.‖).
84. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (―Silence, absent a duty to
disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.‖).
85. BLS‘ Appellate Brief, supra note 13, at 23.
86. Id. at 22.
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a court‘s opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous
statute an agency is charged with administering is not
authoritative, the agency‘s decision to construe that statute
differently from a court does not say that the court‘s
holding was legally wrong. Instead, the agency may,
consistent with the court‘s holding, choose a different
construction, since the agency remains the authoritative
interpreter (within the limits of reason) of such statutes. In
all other respects, the court‘s prior ruling remains binding
law (for example, as to agency interpretations to which
Chevron is inapplicable). The precedent has not been
―reversed‖ by the agency, any more than a federal court‘s
interpretation of a State‘s law can be said to have been
―reversed‖ by a state court that adopts a conflicting (yet
authoritative) interpretation of state law.87
Consequently, the Commission‘s adoption of a rule that interprets
an ambiguous statute differently than had a court on a prior occasion
does not amount to the agency‘s overturning a judicial decision.
Deference to the agency is due, despite a court‘s interpretation of the
ambiguity that precedes and differs from the agency‘s interpretation.88
Thus, a court‘s holding that silence could not constitute a violation of
§ 10(b) absent the breach of a fiduciary (or similar) duty does not
preclude the Commission from promulgating a differing, but
reasonable, rule resolving the statutory ambiguity.
The logic undergirding the Court‘s analysis in Brand X applies to a
situation involving a prior interpretation of statutory ambiguity by the
Court that conflicts with an agency‘s subsequent reasonable
interpretation. That is, earlier Court precedent that interprets statutory
ambiguity and requires the breach of a fiduciary (or similar) duty for a
violation of § 10(b) should not preclude the Commission from
interpreting the ambiguity differently. Some, however, might
distinguish Brand X, because the subsequent agency decision conflicted
with a lower court‘s decision, not Supreme Court precedent.89
Therefore, one should examine whether Supreme Court precedent
87. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983–84
(2005) (citation omitted).
88. See id. at 982–83; Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank, LTD, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2889 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the Commission never acted to change court-created
common law); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, LTD, 551 U.S. 308, 332 (2007) (Scalia,
J. concurring in the judgment) (noting that discretion is ―conferred upon administrative
agencies, which need not adopt what courts would consider the interpretation most faithful to
the text of the statute, but may choose some other interpretation, so long as it is within the
bounds of the reasonable‖).
89. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 979.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss1/2

18

Cleveland: Resurrecting Deference to the Securities and Exchange Commission:

2013]

RESURRECTING DEFERENCE TO THE SECURITES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

91

precludes the Commission‘s interpretation as forged in Rule 10b52(b)(1).
2. Consideration of the Court‘s Securities Law Precedent
Despite Supreme Court precedent repeatedly describing the breach
of a fiduciary (or similar) duty before silence can be deceptive under
§ 10(b), the precedent does not preclude the Commission from
promulgating Rule 10b5-2(b)(1). Because the Court repeatedly resolved
cases involving fiduciaries, it repeatedly described a fiduciary duty as
the source of the duty to disclose. In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the
culpable defendants were insiders of the corporation (who tipped
outsiders),90 and thus, fiduciaries of the deceived selling shareholders.
In O’Hagan, the culpable defendant was an attorney associated with the
law firm representing the deceived party,91 and thus, a fiduciary. In
Chiarella v. United States, the culpable defendant was an agent
associated with the printer working on behalf of the deceived party,92
and thus, a fiduciary.93 In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, the
culpable defendants were broker–dealers,94 who, in certain
circumstances, are subject to fiduciary duties.95 In Dirks v. SEC, the
defendant was neither culpable nor a fiduciary, but the Court
emphasized that he did not enter a confidentiality agreement with the
source, nor did he misappropriate information.96 Despite the Court‘s
repeated descriptions of the breach of fiduciary duty as the source of the
90. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 227 n.2; Brief for Respondents, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988) (No. 86-279), 1987 WL 881063, at *24 n.9.
91. See United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647–48 (1997).
92. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
93. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (―Agency is the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a ‗principal‘) manifests assent to another person (an
‗agent‘) that the agent shall act on the principal‘s behalf and subject to the principal‘s control,
and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.‖); Macey, supra note 10, at 41
(―The presence or absence of a fiduciary duty should be viewed as a consequence of a
contractual relationship between the firm and another party.‖).
94. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151–52 (1972).
95. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 913, 124 Stat. 1376, 1828 (2010); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER–DEALER REGULATION IN
A NUTSHELL §53, at 154–55 (2003); Langevoort, supra note 75, at 442 (stating that courts,
regulators, and broker–dealers themselves have been ―working hard to try to turn the brokerage
industry into something better than the retail mattress or shoe business‖). But see Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646, 665 n.26 (1983).
96. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (noting that a duty to disclose arises from a fiduciary
relationship); id. at 648 (noting that the defendant had no contractual or other relationship with
the corporate source); id. at 665 (―[The defendant] took no action, directly or indirectly, that
induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him.
There was no expectation by [his] sources that he would keep their information in confidence.
Nor did [the defendant] misappropriate or illegally obtain the information about Equity
Funding.‖).
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duty to disclose, ―such descriptions are just that—descriptive.‖97
Section 10(b) says nothing about fiduciary duty, so requiring a breach
thereof misses the mark.98 ―‗Fiduciary duties‘ are a questionable basis
on which to distinguish insiders from others.‖99
Nothing in Dirks, or any other Supreme Court precedent, precludes
the requisite duty from being imposed by contract. To the contrary,
when discussing the breach of a fiduciary duty, the Court has employed
language applicable—without stretch or strain—to the breach of a
confidentiality agreement. Regarding the obligations of corporate
outsiders, the Court wrote:
The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply
that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate
information, but rather that they have entered into a special
confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of
the enterprise and are given access to information solely for
corporate purposes. . . . For such a duty to be imposed,
however, the corporation must expect the outsider to keep
the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the
relationship at least must imply such a duty.100
A corporate source agrees to disclose confidential information under a
confidentiality agreement ―for corporate purposes,‖ not for altruistic
reasons benefitting the confidant to the detriment of the source. What
better way to set forth the corporation‘s ―expectations‖ regarding
confidentiality than an express agreement? If the relationship ―at least
must imply‖ a duty of confidentiality, then why could an agreement not
expressly impose such a duty? Although the Court also referenced
―special‖ relationships, perhaps suggesting that simple contractual
relationships are not special, the Court dealt with implied obligations.
So, while it may be inappropriate to imply the requisite duty in a simple
contractual relationship, neither § 10(b) nor Court precedent precludes
the breach of a contractually imposed duty as forming the basis for a
§ 10(b) violation.

97. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010).
98. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 48–49 (2nd Cir. 2009); see also United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2nd Cir. 1991) (―[SEC‘s] Rule 14e-3(a) . . . creates a duty in
those traders who fall within its ambit to abstain or disclose, without regard to whether the
trader owes a pre-existing fiduciary duty to respect the confidentiality of the information.‖).
99. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 269 (1991).
100. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14; see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980)
(embracing the position that the requisite duty underlying § 10(b) culpability could arise from
―the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose‖).
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Deception is what § 10(b) requires,101 and the breach of a fiduciary
duty is simply one means of establishing deception; it is not the
exclusive means of doing so.102 Counseling against the requirement of a
fiduciary duty as the exclusive source of a duty to disclose is the Court‘s
own caution against using ―rigid classifications‖ with respect to
securities fraud.103 It merits mention that, in this setting, the Court refers
to a fiduciary or similar duty, indicating that silence could be deceptive
in nonfiduciary settings.104 Additionally, the Court cited the
Restatement (Second) of Torts as authority for its position that a
defendant‘s silence, while subject to a fiduciary duty, can constitute
deception in a securities trade; but the Restatement also provides that
silence can be deceptive in nonfiduciary settings. 105 Because the Court
has dealt with fiduciaries, it has not been required to address silence-asdeception by nonfiduciaries, which hardly precludes the Commission
from filling the statutory gap. One is ―feigning fidelity‖106 to the source
when, after agreeing to safeguard information and without disclosure of
the breach, one breaches either an implied fiduciary duty of confidence
or a contractually imposed duty of confidence.107
101. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977).
102. See id. at 474–75 (holding that an alleged fiduciary breach that is not coupled with an
alleged omission or misstatement cannot constitute deception or manipulation); Dorozhko, 574
F.3d at 49 (―[W]hat is sufficient is not always what is necessary . . . .‖); id. at 50 (―In its
ordinary meaning, ‗deceptive‘ covers a wide spectrum of conduct involving . . . trading in
falsehoods.‖); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1986) (―Although Dirks
disapproved of certain trading by insiders or quasi-insiders who owe a fiduciary duty to
investors, courts are not thereby constrained from recognizing other misconduct. To give Dirks
such preclusive effect would suggest that one application of a statute cannot admit of another
application not raised in the first case.‖); Karmel, supra note 15, at 97 (―There is a difference
between interpreting a broad or ambiguous statute or rule by referring to the common law, and
holding . . . that a statute and rule is limited by the common law. Congress passed broad,
remedial securities legislation, like the Exchange Act, in order to make the public securities
markets fair and equitable because of the inadequacies in the common law.‖).
103. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961));
Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. See generally United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659
(1997) (rejecting rigid classifications of defendants: ―it makes scant sense to hold a lawyer like
O‘Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm representing the target of a tender offer,
but not if he works for a law firm representing the bidder.‖); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 249
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (rigid classification).
104. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (―[F]iduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence . . . .‖).
105. See id. at 247–48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Langevoort, supra note 78, at 872 n.30
(―The Court‘s [Chiarella] opinion reads as if the Restatement (Second) of Torts supports its
restriction of the duty to disclose to fiduciary relationships. In fact, as Justice Blackmun‘s
dissent discusses, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (and the common law generally) support a
broader duty to disclose.‖) (citations omitted).
106. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655.
107. For example, when interpreting the mail fraud statute, the Court determined that
misappropriation of information contrary to a confidentiality agreement constitutes deception.
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C. Reasonable Interpretation of Statutory Ambiguity
Courts enforce reasonable agency-promulgated rules, not those that
are arbitrary and capricious.108 The litigant who challenges the validity
of an agency‘s rule bears the burden of establishing that the rule is
arbitrary and capricious.109 Because portions of the forgoing analysis
suggest that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) is reasonable, the following subsections
highlight a few areas emphasized by the Court.
1. Consistency
Courts accord deference to consistently applied, long-standing
agency positions.110 The Commission‘s position regarding Rule 10b52(b)(1) has been consistent. No evidence has been located that the
Commission previously claimed that the breach of a confidentiality
agreement could not constitute deception under § 10(b). For decades,
the Commission has advocated that the breach of a confidentiality
agreement could constitute deception. Moreover, the Commission‘s
long-standing position is consistent with long-standing common law.111
In a 1961 administrative action, the Commission disciplined a
corporate insider, who was subject to fiduciary duties, for insider
See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987) (―The concept of ‗fraud‘ includes the act
of embezzlement, which is ‗the fraudulent appropriation to one‘s own use of the money or
goods entrusted to one‘s care by another.‘‖) (citing Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 189 (1902));
Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 28 (holding that conduct is fraudulent when, contrary to a duty of
confidentiality, one appropriates confidential information ―all the while pretending to perform
his duty of safeguarding it‖).
108. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
109. See City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (―The party
challenging an agency‘s action as arbitrary and capricious bears the burden of proof.‖) (quoting
Lomak Petroleum, Inc. v. FERC, 206 F.3d 1193, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). But see Stephen J.
Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 43 (2003)
(arguing for a presumption against the Commission‘s regulatory intervention) (―[M]onopolistic
regulators should face a stronger presumption against intervention than regulators facing
competition.‖).
110. See Alaska Dep‘t. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004); Barnhart
v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944) (linking persuasiveness to agency interpretations that are long-standing and consistently
applied). An agency position, however, need not be long-standing to benefit from Chevron
deference; otherwise, ossification of the law could result. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 853–59, 865–66 (1984).
111. See Reply Brief of the SEC, Appellant, with Citations to Deferred Joint Appendix at
14, SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000) (No. 00-1293) [hereinafter SEC Brief] (―This is
merely in keeping with the long-standing common law doctrine that a person may assume a
fiduciary duty by voluntarily accepting the confidence of another.‖) (collecting cases). See
generally 4 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 19.2, at 104–05 (1978) (―In the
oral trust situation, . . . the grantee usually was guilty of no wrong in accepting title to hold in
trust for the grantor . . . . His wrong occurs after the transfer and consists of his breach of the
confidence reposed in him.‖).
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trading; however, in so doing, the Commission specifically stated that
its position applied beyond corporate insiders.112 Relationships that
could give rise to culpability include those ―giving access . . . to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit‖113 of the confidant. Though the
Commission did not expressly reference confidentiality agreements, its
stated position would apply to such agreements, and presaged a position
that would more fully develop over time. In the 1980s, 1990s, and
2000s, prior to the adoption of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), the Commission
articulated its position that the breach of a confidentiality agreement
could constitute deception that violated § 10(b).
In 1985, the Commission—as amicus in a criminal prosecution—
supported the position that ―[t]he origin of the confidence . . . [is]
immaterial.‖114 In United States v. Reed, a son betrayed his father by
trading on material, nonpublic information that the father disclosed to
the son. Despite the absence of any reliance by the father on the son as a
fiduciary, and despite the absence of an agreement between the two, the
court accepted the Commission‘s position that the requisite deception
could be inferred due to the pair‘s history of shared confidences. 115 In
Reed, the court recognized an obligation owed to the source of
information that was not embodied in an express agreement, and
accepted the Commission‘s position that the obligation that the
defendant owed to the source could be based upon ―an agreement . . . of
confidentiality, express or implied.‖116 The Commission has long
advocated that the defendant may voluntarily subject himself to the
requisite duty through a confidentiality agreement, in light of the
uncertainty that attends a court‘s ex post, ad hoc implication of the
requisite duty. The Court has referenced the value of certainty in the
regulation of securities.117
In a criminal prosecution from the 1990s, where the Commission
and the Department of Justice jointly signed a brief, the Commission
repeated its position that a confidentiality agreement could impose the
requisite duty of confidentiality that, if breached, could result in a
violation of § 10(b) for insider trading.118 The Commission‘s brief
112. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
113. Id.
114. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
115. See id. at 709. No dominance or superiority is required when there is an express
promise of fidelity. See id. (citing PALMER, supra note 111, §§ 19.2–.4, at 95–134).
116. Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 718; id. at 717 (―[E]ven in the absence of an express agreement,
it properly may be determined that a confidential relationship existed . . . .‖).
117. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.17 (1983) (―Unless the parties have some
guidance as to where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and uses,
neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is crossed.‖).
118. Brief for the United States at 27, United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.
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phrased the issue as ―[whether the defendant was] bound by an
agreement or understanding of confidentiality, express or
implied, . . . that . . . generated . . . a
justifiable
expectation
of
confidentiality and fidelity.‖119 The en banc court accepted the
Commission‘s position that breaching a confidentiality agreement could
constitute deception and form the basis of an enforcement action under
§ 10(b).120
In a 1990 enforcement action, the Commission set forth its position
that the requisite deception in a misappropriation case could be founded
upon the breach of an agreement between occupants of neighboring
businesses regarding the handling of mail.121 According to the
Commission, Bruce Warren breached a duty of trust and confidence to
his neighbor when he opened a letter addressed to the neighbor that was
marked ―personal and confidential,‖ then provided a tip to an individual
who traded on the basis of the material, nonpublic information
contained therein.122
In 2000, shortly before the adoption of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), the
Commission again advocated its position that a confidentiality
agreement could impose the requisite duty to the source of material,
nonpublic information.123 In the Commission‘s enforcement action
against Michael Sargent, Dennis Shephard, and Robert Scharn, the
source had informed a confidant that the information should not be
disclosed to anyone else, and the confidant had assured the source that
he would not disclose it.124 The court accepted the Commission‘s
position that the defendant‘s culpability could rest upon ―a promise by
the misappropriator that the information would be safeguarded.‖125
The Commission‘s long-standing consistency in its position
supports an inference of congressional acceptance of that position.
When Congress repeatedly amends a statute, in the face of a longstanding agency position, without upsetting the agency‘s position, such
1991) (No. 89-1276).
119. Id. (quoting Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 718).
120. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571 (―Keith‘s status as Susan‘s husband could not itself
establish fiduciary status. Nor, absent a pre-existing fiduciary relation or an express agreement
of confidentiality, could the coda—‗Don‘t tell.‘‖) (emphasis added).
121. See Litigation Release No. 12338, SEC v. Pencikowski, 45 SEC Docket 381 (Jan. 8,
1990).
122. See id. at 381–82; 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION,
ENFORCEMENT, AND PREVENTION § 6.04[2], at 6-21 n.22 (1991).
123. See SEC Brief, supra note 111, at 21.
124. See id.; SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2000) (―Aldrich told Shepard that
this fact needed to be kept confidential and Shepard agreed not to disclose the information.‖).
125. Sargent, 229 F.3d at 75 (―[T]he existence of a fiduciary relationship turns on whether
the source of the misappropriated information granted the misappropriator access to confidential
information in reliance on a promise by the misappropriator that the information would be
safeguarded.‖).
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congressional inaction regarding the agency‘s position lends credence to
that position, and favors judicial deference.126 Congress has amended
the Exchange Act both since the Commission set forth its position
informally,127 and since the Commission formally promulgated Rule
10b5-2(b)(1).128 That rule commands judicial deference.
2. Consideration of Regulatory Alternatives
Chevron deference also hinges on the importance of the issue being
administratively enforced.129 The Commission relies heavily upon
§ 10(b) (including Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder), leading some to
refer to that tandem as the ―workhorse for securities fraud
prevention.‖130 Enforcement by the Commission may be critical in
misappropriation cases because viable alternatives are scarce. Although
courts link Chevron deference to the thoroughness of the agency‘s
deliberation, and an agency‘s thorough deliberation would include
consideration of alternatives to its chosen regulatory rule, courts should
be mindful of their limited role. Otherwise, courts run the risk, when
examining regulatory alternatives, of undertaking inquiries like
―whether the agency should regulate at all‖ and ―whether the agency
should have chosen a different means of regulation,‖ which are not for
the court,131 and which are beyond the scope of this Article.132
Despite the court‘s limited role, some alternatives to Rule 10b52(b)(1) are addressed here. For example, criminal prosecution presents
one alternative, but many prefer civil public enforcement to criminal
public enforcement.133 Even if Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) provides some
126. See Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
220 (2002).
127. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98
Stat. 1264 (1984) (authorizing the Commission to seek three times the gain or loss avoided).
128. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 763, 124 Stat. 1376, 1762 (2010); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§ 1106, 116 Stat. 745, 810 (2002).
129. See Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222; Brookings Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 1153, 1169
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that an agency has a ―duty to consider responsible alternatives‖).
130. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence,
63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 641 (2010); see also David M. Brodsky & Daniel J. Kramer, A Critique
of the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 41, 45 (1998)
(―[S]ection 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have become the primary provisions for prosecuting insider
trading.‖).
131. See Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs, 545 U.S. 967, 982–
83 (2005); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44
(1984).
132. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
133. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Perils of Criminalizing Agency Costs, 2 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 59 (2007) (discussing the negative ramifications of subjecting corporate agents to
criminal penalties); Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361,
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certainty, the general uncertainty that attends the regulation of insider
trading may counsel against criminal prosecution.134
Some prefer the states to the federal government when it comes to
regulating securities,135 but Congress has acted contrary to such
preferences by creating a federal regulatory regime,136 by preempting
state regulation in certain areas,137 and going so far as to use the federal
regulation of securities to encroach on matters of corporate law, which
traditionally has been an area of state regulation.138 Congress
emphasized the applicability of federal law to insider trading and
enhanced the Commission‘s authority regarding insider trading.139
Moreover, Congress has suggested that its regulations apply to the
misappropriation theory of insider trading.140

369–71 (2008) (same).
134. See Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1622 (noting the incoherence of insider-trading law
and attributing that incoherence, in part, to its development over time through individual
enforcement actions). See generally Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (―[I]t is
appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute‘s
coverage.‖).
135. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR
SECURITIES REGULATION 48–49 (2002); Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism and Insider Trading, 6
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123, 125 (1998) (―State law already offers better-developed legal rules
regarding property rights.‖).
136. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006) (creating the Commission); id. § 78aa (creating
exclusive federal jurisdiction for matters arising under the Exchange Act).
137. See id. § 77r(a). But see id. §§ 78bb(a), (f).
138. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521, 1523 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack
Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1783–84 (2011). In limited
areas, Congress has precluded enforcement by state entities. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2006). The
argument that an unsupervised federal agency has wrongfully infringed on the states‘ domain
loses force when the agency‘s position is long-standing. The Commission‘s position set forth in
Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) is long-standing. See supra Subsection II.C.1.
139. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98
Stat. 1264 (1984) (authorizing the Commission to seek three times the gain or loss avoided).
140. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6047
(―Under current case law, the SEC must establish that the person misusing the information has
breached either a fiduciary duty to shareholders or some other duty not to misappropriate insider
information.‖); H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 26 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043,
6063 (―[T]he codification of a right of action for contemporaneous traders is specifically
intended to overturn court cases which have precluded recovery for plaintiffs where the
defendant‘s violation is premised upon the misappropriation theory.‖); H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at
4–5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2277–78 (―[C]onversion for personal gain of
information lawfully obtained abuses relationships of trust and confidence and is no less
reprehensible than the outright theft of nonpublic information. In other areas of the law,
deceitful misappropriation of confidential information by a fiduciary . . . has consistently been
held to be [criminal]. The Congress has not sanctioned a less rigorous code of conduct [for civil
matters] under the federal securities laws.‖) (citation omitted).
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We commonly turn to public enforcement when private enforcement
is lacking.141 So, does private enforcement suffer from any
shortcomings? Private enforcement of misappropriation cases under
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act will frequently fail. The deceived source
often will not have purchased or sold securities, and would therefore
lack standing under § 10(b).142 Private misappropriation actions by
third-party traders under § 10(b) may also be doomed for failure to
establish reliance and causation.143 Private enforcement by a class under
state law may be precluded,144 and individual actions may be costprohibitive.145
Instead of securities-based litigation, what about a simple contract
claim for breaching the confidentiality agreement?146 Proving a breach
may be problematic; even if done, remedies may be lacking. The source
of information faces tremendous difficulty in identifying how the
confidential information entered the market or who is responsible for
the leak. The one entrusted with information may have disguised her
trades or surreptitiously tipped others about the information.147 Such
difficulties of detection lessen private enforcement, and counsel in favor
of public enforcement, as the federal government possesses greater
detection tools.148 Multiple private parties—such as the source and a
141. Barack Obama, U.S. President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-addre
ss (―[G]overnment should do for people only what they cannot do better by themselves, and no
more.‖) (crediting Abraham Lincoln).
142. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738–39 (1975).
143. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152–53
(2006) (requiring private plaintiffs to establish reliance); Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005) (requiring private plaintiff to establish loss causation).
144. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
§ 101(b), 112 Stat. 3227, 3230 (1998); Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87–88 (2006).
145. See COX, supra note 3, at 747 (―[Because] most purchasers or sellers have relatively
small amounts at stake . . . , the class action device is often the only economically viable means
of achieving the compensatory and deterrent goals underlying the private action.‖).
146. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 263 (―That no uniform rule is optimal
implies that the subject is best left to negotiations between insiders (and others) and the firm.
Courts would enforce actual contracts . . . .‖).
147. See JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 68 (1991) (―Using codes was fun; it gave
their insider-trading scheme the aura of a Hardy Boys escapade. Soon they were engaged in
conversations so riddled with codes they would have seemed ludicrous to any listener.‖); Kara
Scannell, SEC Loss Shows Difficulty of Insider Cases, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2010, at C1
(showing that insider trading is notoriously difficult to detect when intelligent individuals
attempt to shield their actions).
148. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 263 (―[T]he difficulty of enforcing
such contracts makes it impossible for firms to achieve optimal allocations of the rights.
Insiders‘ trades are notoriously hard to detect . . . . If firms seeking to curtail inside trading by
contract cannot enforce their choices, then the benefits are lost. . . . If the probability of
detecting improper trades is low, public enforcement may be best.‖); Macey, supra note 10, at
46 n.185 (―[T]he cost to the firm of insuring that managers do not abuse their right to trade may
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self-regulatory organization, such as a stock exchange—may monitor
the same subject. Duplicative private enforcement may contribute to
underenforcement,149 as each monitor allocates fewer resources to
monitoring the confidant on the mistaken belief that another monitor
will continue its vigilance. A single public enforcer may be superior.150
Remedies for breach may be inadequate. The potential for profit
may incentivize contract breaches, which, if detected, may be
underdeterred by a simple damages claim.151 The risk of reputational
harm may prevent some parties from breaching a confidentiality
agreement, but reputational harm provides far less discipline for
nonrepeat players. Although the public eventually would have learned
of Cuban‘s trades, the public might not have learned of the
confidentiality agreement (which was an oral agreement152) or its
breach. For some, such as Cuban, reputational harm may not jeopardize
future opportunities to a degree that adequately disciplines them for
their breaches. Mark Cuban has billions of dollars to invest, and he
earned his money through his technological savvy. Because of his
money and experience, Cuban probably would be presented with
opportunities, even if he were known to have breached a confidentiality
agreement. Recognizing that private remedies may be inadequate,
Congress bolstered the remedies that the government may seek.153
It is no secret that post-disclosure private remedies are inadequate
for the breach of a confidentiality agreement. A confidentiality
agreement itself reflects the shortcomings of post-disclosure remedies.
Confidentiality agreements typically provide for specific performance
because of the difficulty of determining damages. Moreover,
confidentiality agreements also require that the confidant provide notice
to the source prior to any potential compelled disclosure. The notice
provision allows for the possibility of the source obtaining a protective
raise the cost of transacting, thereby making it more efficient for the firm to ban such trading.‖).
149. Cf. Macey, supra note 10, at 59 (noting that reliance on private enforcement ―may
result in a suboptimal level of enforcement‖).
150. Compare EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 263, with Henry G. Manne,
Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 565 (1970) (―I do not believe
[the SEC‘s] enforcement techniques are nearly as good as they say . . . .‖).
151. See Macey, supra note 10, at 59. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
99, at 260. Moreover, the expected gain may exceed the expected loss, due to the low likelihood
of detection. By allegedly trading on inside information, Martha Stewart risked millions and
incarceration to avoid the loss of a relatively nominal sum. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart
Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1044 (Del. 2004) (referencing plaintiff‘s
claim that Stewart‘s illegal trades jeopardized the company‘s financial future); Litigation
Release No. 18169, SEC v. Stewart, 80 SEC Docket 1244 (June 4, 2003) (discussing allegations
against Stewart, whose trades avoided the loss of less than $50,000).
152. See Complaint, supra note 3, at 4.
153. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984) (authorizing the Commission to seek three times the gain or loss avoided).
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order. Post-disclosure remedies may prove inadequate to discipline the
breaching party.
A final alternative might be no regulation at all, as the market may
discipline insider trading. First, in support of this alternative, long-term
considerations might deter any potential improper short-term focus by
insiders.154 Second, a rule that allows insiders to trade might permit the
source to compensate the insider more efficiently, by, for example,
lowering annual salary in light of the insider‘s ability to trade profitably
on material nonpublic information.155 Counterarguments exist. Even if
the threat of long-term costs commonly deters an individual from
engaging in short-term misconduct, some individuals sacrifice longterm benefits for short-term gain.156 A general truth need not prevent the
promulgation of a rule designed to address uncommon behavior. (And,
of course, such uncommon behavior may be far more common than
realized.) Aware of the consequences of such long-term for short-term
trade-offs, the government may regulate private parties‘ compensation
schemes. One recent example follows. In the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of
2002, Congress prohibited businesses from compensating their
accountants in certain ways because of externalities.157 Accountants at
Arthur Andersen LLP helped fell the firm because their compensation
scheme led them to compare their personal benefits and costs, ignoring
third-party costs, even though those costs were leviathan.158 The impact
of the accountants‘ misdeeds reached well beyond themselves,
154. See MANNE, supra note 16, at 148–51.
155. See id. at 138.
156. See John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial
Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 5–6 (2005); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued
Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5, 14–15 (2005); Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1604.
157. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 201–03, 206, 116 Stat. 745,
773–775 (2002); id. § 402(a), 787 (prohibiting executives to be compensated through loans). In
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress responded to
criticisms of the excesses of executive compensation by empowering shareholders of certain
corporations to have a ―say on pay.‖ See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). See generally LUCIAN
A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (describing the excesses of executive compensation and
discussing managerial influence over executive compensation).
158. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1239 (2002)
(―The previous paragraphs addressed the independence of Andersen as a firm, but of course
services were delivered by specific agents of the firm, its Houston partners. It now seems that
the compensation of the Houston partners was significantly tied to their client billings both for
auditing services and for consulting services. Enron might have been a relatively small client for
Andersen, the firm, but it was the largest client for its Houston office, and, for the Enron
relationship partners, perhaps their only significant client. . . . The disparity between the value of
the Houston partners‘ share of Andersen‘s reputation and the value to them of a continued (or
more lucrative) Enron client relationship sets up an obvious moral hazard problem.‖).
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impacting the credibility of the entire firm, and placing in question the
imprimatur of other accounting firms.159 Allowing insider trading could
incentivize valuable innovation, but such a rule need not yield an
efficient compensation scheme, as insiders could profit on the
innovations of others.160 This scenario was precisely the case in
O’Hagan, where the Court embraced the misappropriation theory.
O‘Hagan exhibited no entrepreneurial skill in creating the valuable,
nonpublic information on which he traded.161
Though some reasonably prefer alternatives to federal regulation of
the misappropriation theory, those alternatives face reasonable
criticisms. The Commission can choose among reasonable regulatory
alternatives.
3. Internal Inconsistency
Courts have struck down agency-promulgated rules as arbitrary and
capricious when those rules are internally inconsistent.162 Perhaps Rule
10b5-2(b)(1) should fall, as the rationale underlying the
misappropriation theory is internally inconsistent. The misappropriation
theory serves, in part, to protect market integrity, but the theory allows
that protection to be circumvented as next described. To protect the
integrity of the secondary markets, we will not allow a misappropriating
confidant to trade on misappropriated information, because other traders
in the market could not, by the sweat of their brow, have obtained the
same information.163 The misappropriation theory, however, permits the
confidant to trade on that information if he admits to the source his
intention to trade, because the source would, in that instance, not be
deceived.164 Even if the source is not deceived, other traders in the
market will continue to be unaware of the material, nonpublic
information, and those other traders still could not have gathered the
information by expending their best efforts. The misappropriation
theory, designed to enhance market integrity, can operate to undermine
159. See id.; A.C. Pritchard, The Irrational Auditor and Irrational Liability, 10 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 19, 26 (2006).
160. See MANNE, supra note 16, at 156–58.
161. See United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997); MANNE, supra note 16, at
131–45 (discussing the entrepreneur‘s compensation).
162. See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).
163. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53, 658–59; Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51727 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2012)) (―We have
long recognized that the fundamental unfairness of insider trading harms not only individual
investors but also the very foundations of our markets, by undermining investor confidence in
the integrity of the markets.‖); id. at 51729 (―[T]he trader‘s informational advantage stems from
contrivance, not luck, and the informational disadvantage to other investors cannot be overcome
with research or skill.‖) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655.
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it.165 Such internal inconsistency could undermine the validity of Rule
10b5-2(b)(1).
Another internal inconsistency of the misappropriation theory is its
foundation in property law. The theory is supported by the source‘s
property rights in the information misappropriated by the confidant.166
The misappropriation theory prohibits the confidant from exploiting the
property of the source to the source‘s detriment. If the source truly has a
property right in that information, then the source should be free not to
protect that right; that is, the source should be free to opt out of the
Commission‘s regulation of its property. This, however, the source
cannot do.167
While these are sound arguments, they may not persuade the reader.
The alternative to agency resolution of such disputes is resolution by the
courts. In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation
theory; it was not persuaded that the theory was doomed by the
aforementioned internal inconsistencies. Given the Court‘s adoption of
the theory, the Commission need not abandon it.168 Congress has
suggested its support for the misappropriation theory,169 indicating
again that the Commission need not abandon it. Additionally, Congress
has charged the Commission with balancing potentially competing
interests.170 At some level, the charge to protect investors may conflict
with the charge to protect businesses‘ ability to raise capital. Given
Congress‘ (potentially) internally inconsistent mandate, the
Commission‘s rules may be internally inconsistent at some level, which
should not doom deference.171
165. See id. at 689–90 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 653–54; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 254 (―Better, then, to
identify property rights in information.‖); Bainbridge, supra note 37, at 1644–50; Macey, supra
note 10, at 18 n.47 (―Liability for 10b-5 violations is now founded on a theory . . . that finds its
own roots in a ‗business property theory‘ of insider trading liability.‖); see also Manne, supra
note 150, at 549–51 (criticizing the property rights theory).
167. See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2006) (―Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any
person . . . to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and
regulations of the Commission shall be void.‖).
168. Cf. Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887–88 (2010) (―Since the
Commission‘s interpretations relied on cases we disapprove, . . . we owe them no deference.‖).
169. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. See generally STOCK Act, S. 1903, 112th
Cong. (2011) (prohibiting members of Congress and their staff from trading in securities based
upon material nonpublic information learned through the course of their jobs); STOCK Act, S.
1871, 112th Cong. (2011) (same); STOCK Act, H.R. 1148, 112th Cong. (2011) (same). The
Stock Act has since been enacted. See STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4, 126 Stat. 291, 292
(2012).
170. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006) (―Whenever pursuant to this chapter the Commission is
engaged in rulemaking . . . the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote . . . capital formation.‖).
171. See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 181 (1973) (deferring to the
agency when required to ―strik[e] a balance between . . . conflicting legitimate interests‖
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Other attacks, not limited to the misappropriation theory, have been
launched against the coherence of the theory prohibiting insider
trading.172 For example, federal securities laws generally, and the
Commission‘s rules in particular, are designed to enhance efficiency.173
A general attack on the prohibition of insider trading has been that
information does not enter the market through insiders‘ trades, so that
the share price does not accurately reflect material, nonpublic
information; this distorts the cost of capital, and results in the inefficient
allocation of resources.174 This broad conception of efficiency suggests
that insider trading should be permitted, so that material, nonpublic
information enters the market more quickly.175 Although this broad
conception of efficiency (taking into account the interests of third
parties176) counsels in favor of permitting insider trading, a narrow
conception of efficiency counsels against insider trading (taking into
account the interests of the parties to a confidentiality agreement).
Contracts evidence the parties‘ values. A confidentiality agreement that
prohibits the confidant‘s use of information for trading may be the best
evidence of the efficient allocation of the source‘s information.177 Rule
10b5-2(b)(1) embraces the efficient allocation by the parties to the
confidentiality agreement (possibly at the expense of the market‘s
overall efficient allocation of resources), and in furtherance of the
Commission‘s market-integrity argument.178 Even those who disfavor
because that balance is ―often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress
committed primarily‖ to the agency) (internal quotation marks omitted); EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 283 (―[A] rule against fraud is not . . . essential . . . [but] certification
methods [are] costly . . . . A rule against fraud can reduce these costs . . . .‖).
172. See Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1622 (attributing the incoherence of insider-trading
law, in part, to its development over time through individual enforcement actions). See generally
id. at 1610 (noting the internally inconsistent premises of securities regulation that (1) the
typical investors are unsophisticated, and (2) those same investors will comprehend any
mandated disclosure).
173. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006) (―Whenever pursuant to this chapter the Commission is
engaged in rulemaking . . . the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency . . . .‖).
174. Compare Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J.
FIN. 1661, 1661 & n.1 (1992), with Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 631 (noting that an
insider‘s trade has communicative value, but is not an efficient means of communication). But
see Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 75,
78 (2002) (―[T]he cost of equity . . . decreases significantly after the first prosecution [under
insider trading laws].‖).
175. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 257; Manne, supra note 150, at 565–
66.
176. See Manne, supra note 150, at 566 (―The gains from efficiency are diffuse and often
specifically unidentifiable.‖).
177. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 259; Macey, supra note 10, at 46 n.185
(―[I]t may be . . . more efficient for the firm to ban such trading.‖).
178. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2012) (including agreements to maintain information in
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the Commission‘s prohibition of insider trading acknowledge the
benefit of the parties‘ private, efficient allocation regarding the
information: ―[W]hy . . . assume that anyone advocating no government
rule against insider trading is necessarily saying that it may not be
banned in a private contract?‖179 ―[I]f . . . a corporation properly
indicates that its rule is no insider trading, that should be the business of
that corporation and its shareholders and the courts if a violation is
alleged.‖180
4. Relative Institutional Expertise
Besides the standard arguments that favor judicial deference to an
agency—such as a national rule that is uniform across all court
jurisdictions181 and the avoidance of regulatory ossification traceable to
the stare decisis principle employed by courts182—courts defer to
agencies due to their relative expertise.183 Whereas courts generally
resolve legal dilemmas lacking in precision—for example, reasonable
search or totality of the circumstances—an agency may bring science to
bear on certain dilemmas and offer precision ordinarily lacking in legal
disputes, justifying judicial deference to the agency. We might prefer
that, before a court defers to an agency, the agency undertake rigorous
empirical analysis of the expected benefits of contemplated regulation
in light of expected costs of that regulation.184 Some contend that the
confidence within the enumerated ―duties of trust and confidence‖).
179. Manne, supra note 150, at 580.
180. Id. at 581.
181. Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 847–48
(1984).
182. See SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (―[G]rowing
recognition by common-law courts that the doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed
around transactions involving land and other tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale of
such intangibles as advice and securities, and that, accordingly, the doctrines must be adapted to
the merchandise in issue.‖).
183. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66; Langevoort, supra note 78, at 868 (―[T]he Supreme
Court speaks with very little expertise, and hence relatively less subject-matter authority, on
intricate matters of federal regulation such as securities law.‖); see also SEC v. Zandford, 535
U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (―[The SEC‘s] interpretation of the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the
context of formal adjudication, is entitled to deference if it is reasonable, see United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30, and n. 12 (2001).‖); United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S.
642, 673 (―[Section] 14(e)‘s rulemaking authorization gives the Commission ‗latitude,‘ even in
the context of a term of art . . . . [W]e must accord the Commission‘s assessment ‗controlling
weight unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.‘‖).
184. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (―[T]he
Commission relied upon insufficient empirical data . . . .‖); Manne, supra note 150, at 548 (―The
debatable aspects of insider trading are capable of resolution through tools of economic
analysis.‖); id. at 568 (―We must either utilize hard, accurate data or we should proceed on the
assumptions dictated by the most logical economic doctrines.‖); Henry G. Manne, Insider
Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 473, 510 (1967) [hereinafter
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Commission‘s regulation of insider trading is not reasonable, and is
perhaps arbitrary and capricious, because empirical analyses do not
support—or worse, undermine—the rationales offered by the
Commission.185 Some contend that the Commission frequently accords
little weight to such empirical evidence,186 and instead runs to fuzzy
notions of fairness, investor protection, and market integrity to justify
its regulatory efforts.187
Despite the strength of these arguments, the Commission‘s rule is
reasonable. First, although the Commission may rely on fuzzy notions,
those same fuzzy notions motivated Congress to increase the
Commission‘s powers to deter insider trading.188 Additionally, those
same fuzzy notions have motivated decisions by the Court.189 Second,

Manne, Administrative Process] (―[I]n an area like insider trading . . . [,] empirical data and
rigorous economic analysis would be . . . desirable.‖).
On a related note, systematic evidence is preferred to anecdotal evidence. Anecdotes,
however, frequently prompt legislation by Congress. For example, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was
prompted by the accounting scandals at WorldCom and Enron. See Rich Karlgaard, America’s
12-Step Program, FORBES, Jan. 17, 2011, at 24. Anecdotes need not be ignored by the
Commission, and a single anecdote may justify a regulation, depending on its magnitude and the
likelihood of its recurrence.
185. See Meulbroek, supra note 174, at 1661, 1696.
186. See generally Choi & Pritchard, supra note 109, at 30 (―Evidence that does not
discredit regulation unambiguously will be ignored. And the . . . bias will be more pronounced if
the evidence is more complex and subject to conflicting inferences, a fair characterization of
most regulatory problems in the securities markets.‖) (citations omitted).
187. See id. at 33 (―The SEC often uncritically states that it seeks to protect investors—and
in particular, that absent the SEC‘s efforts, investor confidence in the market will deteriorate.
Rarely, however, does the SEC verify that its assumptions are correct. The SEC instead simply
asserts that investor confidence demands its latest regulatory intervention.‖); Manne, Insider
Trading and the Administrative Process, supra note 184, at 506 (―[A] simple allegation of
unfairness [should not] be allowed as a substitute for research and analysis . . . [and] does not
meet the standards which are required for the exercise of administrative expertise.‖).
188. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264, 1264
(1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275 (―Capital
formation and our nation‘s economic growth and stability depend on investor confidence in the
fairness and integrity of our capital markets. Insider trading threatens these markets by
undermining the public‘s expectations of honest and fair markets . . . .‖). Moreover, note that,
while Dean Henry Manne credits psychological and social factors that are consistent with his
theory, see MANNE, supra note 16, at 150 (stating that psychological factors will lead insiders to
produce favorable information, not to produce intentionally unfavorable information), he
discredits psychological and social factors that are inconsistent with his theory. Compare
Manne, Administrative Process, supra note 184, at 506 (criticizing the Commission and
commentators when either references fairness), with MANNE, supra note 16, at 15
(acknowledging that moral standards play an important role in the business community and in
the effective functioning of markets).
189. See Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006) (―The magnitude of the federal
interest in protecting the integrity . . . of the market for nationally traded securities cannot be
overstated.‖).
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the onus is not on the agency to support its regulation with empirical
analysis.190 The party challenging the regulation bears that burden.
Critics of the Commission commonly offer logical arguments
lacking in empirical support.191 For example, critics of the Commission
note that investors seemed to exhibit confidence in the U.S. securities
markets for decades prior to the Commission‘s concerted efforts to
stamp out insider trading in the 1980s.192 The presence of investor
confidence, however, does not address the underlying issue: What is the
appropriate baseline for enforcement? What if pre-1980s investors
exhibited confidence in the U.S. markets due to an absence of viable
alternatives? What if non-U.S. markets during those decades were
riddled with fraud, relative to U.S. markets?193 Though investors may
have exhibited confidence in the U.S. markets prior to the
Commission‘s rigorous enforcement against insider trading, rigorous
enforcement may enhance investor confidence such that the benefits of
enforcement exceed the costs of enforcement.
Allowing Mr. O‘Hagan or Mr. Cuban to trade may enhance the
efficiency of the markets, which is valuable—but how valuable?194 On
the other side of the ledger, allowing insiders to trade creates moral
hazards for insiders,195 which imposes costs. What is the magnitude of
those costs?196 Reliable measures of the benefits and costs may not be
190. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (―[W]e are
acutely aware that an agency need not—indeed cannot—base its every action upon empirical
data; depending upon the nature of the problem, an agency may be ‗entitled to conduct . . . a
general analysis based on informed conjecture.‘ . . . The Commission‘s decision not to do an
empirical study does not make that an unreasoned decision.‖).
191. See Manne, supra note 150, at 570 (shifting the burden to the government to quantify
the benefits of its regulation).
192. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 109, at 35; Manne, supra note 150, at 577 (―[T]he
public has never shown any signs of losing confidence in the stock market because of the
existence of insider trading.‖); see also id. at 564 (noting the ―scarcity‖ of SEC enforcement
actions for insider trading during the 1960s); Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1620 (discussing the
Commission‘s high-profile enforcement campaign against insider trading during the 1980s).
193. See Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary
Comparative Evidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144, 144 (2005) (―[C]ountries with more
prohibitive insider trading laws have . . . more accurate stock prices, and more liquid stock
markets. These findings are generally robust to controlling for measures of disclosure and
enforceability and suggest that formal insider trading laws (especially their deterrence
components) matter to stock market development.‖).
194. See Manne, supra note 150, at 566 (―The gains from efficiency are . . . often
specifically unidentifiable.‖).
195. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2006) (prohibiting directors, officers, and large shareholders
from shorting equity securities of specified issuers); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at
260; Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Q&A: Is Insider Trading Beneficial?,
FAMA/FRENCH FORUM (April 28, 2010), http://www.dimensional.com/famafrench/2010/04/qais-insider-trading-beneficial.html.
196. See Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006) (―The magnitude of the federal
interest in protecting the integrity . . . of the market for nationally traded securities cannot be
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easily obtained.197 Even if obtained, ―empirical evidence . . . can
quickly go stale.‖198
Many economists disagree with the Commission‘s regulation of
insider trading,199 but other widely respected economists believe that
insider trading should be prohibited.200 Given disagreement among
economists, why must the Commission accept the position of some
economists (allow insider trading) rather than other economists
(prohibit insider trading), particularly when Congress and the public
favor the latter group?201 The values emphasized by certain economists
may not be the values emphasized by members of Congress, the
Commission, or the public.
Congress entrusted the Commission to exercise its discretion in
balancing competing evidence and viewpoints.202 Sometimes scientific
precision drives an agency‘s regulation, but sometimes an agency
simply makes policy.203 In § 10(b), Congress authorized the
Commission—not the courts—to make policy. That an agency makes
policy based upon political considerations should not strip the agency‘s
discretion of deference by the courts.204 Congress delegated the policy
overstated.‖).
197. See MANNE, supra note 16, at 59, 70–71 (noting the lack of reliable data); Beny, supra
note 193, at 145 (expressing a preference for empiricism but noting that the insider-trading
debate has largely been theoretical); Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1623 (―[C]lean tests are often
hard to come by.‖).
198. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1606.
199. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading,
35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 895 (1983); Meulbroek, supra note 174, at 1661–63. See generally
Manne, supra note 150, at 547 (expressing gratification at the reception of his work by
economists).
200. See Fama & French, supra note 195; see also Beny, supra note 193, at 144;
Bhattacharya, supra note 174, at 76–78.
201. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275 (―This
legislation provides increased sanctions against insider trading in order to increase deterrence of
violations.‖); Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1620 (―The routine of insider trading
enforcement . . . cases . . . probably reflects the perception that these are the SEC‘s most reliable
public relations tools.‖).
202. See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (―When specialists
express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of
its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more
persuasive.‖).
203. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 1215, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (―When . . . an
agency is obliged to make policy judgments where no factual certainties exist or where facts
alone do not provide the answer, our role is more limited; we require only that the agency so
state and go on to identify the considerations it found persuasive.‖); Emily Hammond Meazell,
Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science,
109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 751–52 (2011) (discussing the science charade).
204. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L. J. 2, 66–68 (2009).
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making function to the Commission, and courts should defer to the
Commission‘s reasonable exercise of its discretion.205 ―[I]t is interesting
how frequently economists find ex post that, notwithstanding the
guesswork, the [Commission‘s] lawmaking predictions turn out
reasonably well.‖206
The insightful criticisms of the ban on insider trading are not new,207
but Congress has repeatedly enacted statutes that implicitly reject such
criticisms.208 The Commission has repeatedly rejected those criticisms
through adjudication and rulemaking. When promulgating Rule 10b52(b)(1), the Commission indicated that the benefits of the rule included
eliminating some of the uncertainty attendant to the regulation of insider
trading,209 and that it attributed no appreciable costs to the rule, and no
commentator suggested otherwise.210 Courts should defer to the
Commission‘s considered judgment.
CONCLUSION
Commentators who have examined the validity of Rule 10b52(b)(1) have considered the Court‘s securities law jurisprudence, but in
the process, they have paid little or no attention to the Court‘s
developing administrative law jurisprudence. By not considering the
role of administrative law, those commentators have approached the
Commission‘s rule with undue skepticism. Deference to the
Commission, however, is due.

205. Manne, Administrative Process, supra note 184, at 510 (―[Insider trading] is not an
area where we can condone the courts making policy because they are comparatively as well
qualified as the agency.‖).
206. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1626.
207. See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 16; Manne, supra note 150, at 548 (noting warmer
reception of his 1966 book by economists than by lawyers).
208. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275 (―This
legislation provides increased sanctions against insider trading in order to increase deterrence of
violations.‖).
209. The Court has emphasized the need for certainty in the regulation of securities fraud.
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.17 (1983) (―Unless the parties have some guidance as to
where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and uses, neither corporate
insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is crossed.‖).
210. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51729 (Aug. 24,
2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2012)).
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